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Abstract
Organizations have leeway in how much they employ their network 
relations to the benefit of their clients. When do they do so more 
rather than less? Relying on research on trust and knowledge 
absorption, the authors suggest that providers’ network relations 
generate better outcomes for their clients when these relations are 
concentrated in a limited, exclusive set of partners. The authors 
argue that providers’ relational exclusivity benefits clients because it 
facilitates the awareness and use of partners’ complementary client 
service capabilities. An analysis of a regional network of patient 
referrals among 110 hospitals supported this argument. The study 
highlights the role of interorganizational partnership networks in 
activating client service capabilities and stimulates further inquiry into 
providers’ network features that benefit the users of their services.
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The implications of interorganizational collaboration 
networks for the benefit of the users of organizations’ 
offerings − variously called consumers, clients, cus-
tomers or patrons − are puzzlingly variable. Clients 
may enjoy substantial quality and price benefits from 
providers’ collaboration networks (Brueckner and 
Whalen, 2000; Morrish and Hamilton, 2002)1. Yet 
network ties among providers may also disadvantage 
their clients by limiting the clients’ ability to choose 
between independent providers or to judge the 
quality of the offerings (Baker and Faulkner, 1993; 
Ingram and Roberts, 2000). Neutral scenarios, when 
providers’ networks do not affect the benefits of the 
users of their services, are also possible.
Why such different outcomes? What determines 
the extent to which providers’ network relations benefit 
their clients? Organizational networks research has 
given this question remarkably short shrift. Studies 
have examined the benefits of provider networks 
for buyer firms (Uzzi, 1997; Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002; 
Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003), but not for individual end 
customers. Studies in other disciplines that touched 
upon the question have generally converged on 
the importance of providers’ motivation to benefit 
their clients. Some studies implied that providers 
may jointly benefit clients when they are intrinsically 
motivated to collaborate in the clients’ interest 
(Bunderson and Thompson, 2009; Leana et al., 2009; 
Wrzesniewski et al., 1997). Others noted a similar 
motivating effect of external pressures to collaborate 
on improving service recipients’ outcomes, including 
institutional pressures by professional associations or 
accreditations agencies (Durand and McGuire, 2005; 
Ruef and Scott, 1998) and competitive pressures 
forcing providers into alliances whose efficiency 
benefits spill over to their clients (Brueckner and 
Whalen, 2000; Morrish and Hamilton, 2002).
1Going forward, we use the term “provider” to denote any 
organization that provides goods or services. Because we 
develop and test an argument that specifically applies to 
providers and users of professional services, we will refer 
to users of providers’ offerings as “clients” or “service 
recipients.” We will use more general terms, such as 
“customer” or “consumer,” when they feature in arguments 
that we reference.
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While the role of providers’ motivation is 
undeniable, motivation cannot fully account for clients’ 
benefits from providers’ network relations. Even 
highly motivated providers can put their networks 
in the service of their clients only to the extent that 
their network relations improve their capability to 
serve clients (Wuyts et al., 2015). A full account of 
service users’ benefits from providers’ networks is 
not possible without understanding when and how 
providers’ networks unlock this capability.
Our study takes an early step toward such 
understanding. We build on the fundamental insight 
of organizational network theory that organizational 
outcomes depend on features of interorganizational 
partnership networks (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011; 
Powell et al., 1999; Uzzi 1996, 1997). We extend 
the notion that features of these networks enable 
organizational outcomes, arguing that network 
features may also enable client outcomes. Building 
on theories of trust and knowledge absorption, 
we argue that relational exclusivity is a feature of 
providers’ ego networks that improves their capability 
to benefit clients: providers’ partnerships produce 
better outcomes for their clients when they connect to 
their partnership network through selected, exclusive 
relations. We further argue that relational exclusivity 
benefits clients by helping providers combine client 
service capabilities; its effect is, therefore, more 
pronounced to the extent that the partners’ client 
service capabilities are complementary.
We examine our argument in a regional patient 
referral network comprising 110 hospitals in Italy. 
We follow the lead of previous studies that used 
data from health care to test theoretical arguments 
generalizable across industries (Barrera and van 
de Bunt, 2009; Drange, 2013) and patient outcome 
data in particular to operationalize client benefit (e.g. 
DiBenigno and Kellogg, 2014; Provan and Milward, 
1995; Schoonhoven, 1981). Specifically, we test the 
effects of referral network features on the benefits that 
patients derive from being routed toward providers of 
better care.
Our research contributes to organizational 
network theory by identifying a provider network 
feature that enables better client outcomes. We 
transcend the motivational explanations of client 
outcomes from providers’ network relations, showing 
that client outcomes depend on the extent to which 
these relations activate providers’ capability to serve 
client needs. The study challenges organizational 
network theory to match the rich literature on 
interorganizational network features that benefit 
providers with an equally rich understanding of 
network features that benefit clients. We also offer 
practical recommendations to policymakers on 
improving client outcomes from provider networks.
Theory and hypotheses
Motivational determinants of client  
outcomes from provider networks
Studies of determinants of client benefits from 
providers’ network relations are spread across 
various literatures and have been in minimal dialogue 
with each other. The common feature of these diverse 
studies is the emphasis on providers’ motivation. In 
different ways, they suggested that providers are 
motivated to use their network relations in the interest 
of the client insofar as the providers’ rewards are 
interdependent with their clients’ outcomes.
The interdependence of providers’ and customers’ 
outcomes is most obvious when it is inherent in the 
nature of the transaction. For example, in the venture 
capital industry, the investing firms’ collaboration ties 
simultaneously benefit the investing firms and their 
investment targets (Hochberg et al., 2007; Ozmel 
et al., 2020). Similar interdependence may exist due 
to contractual arrangements, such as contingent fee 
contracts in legal and financial services, which explicitly 
make providers’ rewards dependent on clients’ 
outcomes (Gravelle and Waterson, 1993; Rau, 2000).
However, the interests of providers and their 
customers are usually imperfectly aligned. Then, 
providers have leeway to disregard the benefit of 
the customers in their network relations, or even 
to act against it. In the milder of such scenarios, a 
fully booked hotel whose management is linked 
to another hotel by friendship relations may refer 
potential customers to that partner hotel (Ingram 
and Roberts, 2000); thus, steering them away from 
better competing offers. The more drastic scenarios 
have attracted economists’ attention since the 
days of Adam Smith, who famously commented 
that “people of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, 
or in some contrivance to raise prices” (Smith, [1776] 
1991:116). Modern research examines similar designs 
by “people of the same trade” under the rubric of 
organized special interests (Boies, 1989; Grier et al., 
1991) or collusion (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1990).
When providers’ outcomes are loosely related 
to clients’ outcomes, two categories of factors may 
motivate organizations to jointly improve clients’ 
outcomes. First, organizations may be motivated by 
external pressures. Most obviously, such pressure may 
come from antitrust regulators explicitly tasked with 
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preventing and punishing collaboration that is harmful 
to clients. Professional associations or accreditation 
agencies may also exert external pressure on 
providers to adopt service standards above and 
beyond government regulations (Durand and McGuire, 
2005; Ruef and Scott, 1998), including standards that 
regulate providers’ collaboration (Cohen and Hilligoss, 
2010; Patterson, 2008). Furthermore, competitive 
pressure may impel providers to jointly benefit clients, 
e.g. by forming alliances that improve services and 
cut prices (Brueckner and Whalen, 2000; Morrish and 
Hamilton, 2002).
Second, providers may be intrinsically motivated 
to provide good customer experience. Research has 
highlighted a secular sense of calling − that is, con-
struing work as a fulfilling, socially useful activity − and 
shown the role of calling in sustaining the quality of ser-
vice (Bunderson and Thompson, 2009; Wrzesniewski 
et al., 1997; Wuyts et al., 2015). Individuals or organi-
zations driven by a sense of calling may collaboratively 
craft work routines that lead to better service quality 
(Leana et al., 2009).
Enabling network features
No matter how motivated providers are to put 
their network ties in the service of clients, they can 
only do so if their own and their network partners’ 
capabilities can be joined in ways that produce better 
client service (Wuyts et al., 2015). Without denying 
the importance of motivational factors, we therefore 
shift the focus to the role of network features that 
unlock providers’ capabilities to jointly benefit clients. 
We extend the basic insight of network theory that 
individuals’ and organizations’ outcomes depend on 
features of the networks in which they are embedded 
(Granovetter, 1985; Borgatti and Halgin, 2011), 
positing that network features may also shape the 
outcomes that organizations produce for their clients.
Network features enabling  
organizational outcomes
An extensive, vibrant literature has documented features 
of organizations’ ego networks that enable beneficial 
organizational outcomes. For example, a balanced mix 
of strong and weak ties in a firm’s network has been 
shown to improve its survival chances (Uzzi, 1996). 
There is evidence that firms that are well-connected 
(central) in their industry’s overall network attain better 
performance (Powell et al., 1999; Tan et al., 2015), 
and so do firms whose network partners are diverse 
(Baum et al., 2000). Studies found that organizations’ 
innovation performance is better when their networks 
bridge between industry peers (Soda, 2011) and when 
they have fewer ties connecting them to competitors 
through intermediaries (Pahnke et al., 2015). Networks 
that connect organizations to disconnected, non-
redundant partners have been shown to be advan-
tageous to organizations’ performance in uncertain, 
entrepreneurial environments, while networks that 
connect to highly interconnected partners are advan-
tageous in stable environments (Baum et al., 2014; 
Rowley et al., 2000).
Relational exclusivity as an enabler  
of client outcomes
Service providers routinely shape the outcomes not 
only for themselves but also for their clients. Given the 
amply evidenced potential of beneficially structured 
networks to create economic value for providers, we 
suggest that features of providers’ networks have a 
comparable potential to shape the benefits of their 
clients. Rather than attempt to develop an exhaustive 
theory of providers’ ego network features that are 
favorable to client outcomes, our study takes an early 
step toward such theory by identifying one favorable 
feature, relational exclusivity.
Providers’ network relations are exclusive to 
the extent that they are concentrated to few select 
partners rather than evenly spread across available 
partners (see Figure 1 for illustration). We argue that 
providers linked to the network through exclusive 
relations − sometimes synonymously referred to as 
embedded relations (Uzzi, 1996; Shipilov, 2005) − 
better cater to client needs because such relations 
facilitate providers’ awareness and use of the 
partners’ client service capabilities2.
Theory suggests two reasons why relational 
exclusivity helps develop awareness of partners’ 
capabilities to serve clients. First, exclusive commit-
ment to a limited set of network partners generates, 
and is generated by, mutual trust (Granovetter, 1985; 
Gulati, 1995; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Partners 
who develop trust are more willing to mutually disclose 
information without fearing harmful consequences 
(Levin and Cross, 2004; Lui and Ngo, 2004; Mayer 
et al., 1995). Openness about an organization’s 
shortcomings in client service is particularly helpful in 
2Despite the affinity between relational exclusivity and 
Granovetter’s (1985) notion of embeddedness, we avoid 
treating the two concepts as equivalent because alterna-
tive operationalizations of embeddedness have been sug-
gested (e.g. Moody and White, 2003).
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informing its partners how they can assist its clients. 
For example, firms more fully disclose their products’ 
typical problems to external customer support partners 
who they have trusted relational ties to; awareness of 
the problems in turn helps such partners provide good 
customer support (Wuyts et al., 2015). Similarly, clinical 
history paperwork that accompanies patients referred 
between hospitals may reveal shortcomings in the 
referring hospital’s treatment (with potential reputational 
and legal repercussions) − but the shortcomings also 
suggest what the receiving hospital can do for the 
patient that the sending hospital could not (Iwashyna 
and Courey, 2011; Lomi and Pallotti, 2012). Thus, by 
enabling trust-based disclosure, relational exclusivity 
better positions providers to combine their capabilities 
in ways that benefit clients.
Second, exclusive relations help partners over-
come obstacles to knowledge absorption. A substan-
tial share of knowledge that collaborators need to 
complete joint tasks is tacit, complex or both. The 
absorption of tacit or complex knowledge depends on 
assistance that its source offers. Because partners in 
embedded, exclusive relations have more willingness 
and shared time to assist each other in absorbing 
knowledge, and to ask for assistance, such relations 
have proved instrumental for tacit and complex 
organizational learning (Szulanski, 1996; Uzzi, 1997). 
The notion that exclusive relations help convey and 
retain tacit knowledge has been invoked to explain 
the very existence of organizations (Kogut and Zander, 
1992). Insofar as the use of exclusive relations to link 
to the network facilitates the absorption of knowledge 
that may benefit organizations, we expect it to have 
the same effect on knowledge that helps them jointly 
benefit their clients.
The relationship between providers’ relational 
exclusivity and the benefits of their service recipients 
may be summarized as follows:
H1. A provider generates more benefit to service 
recipients through its partnership ties to the 
extent that the provider concentrates relations 
to few partners rather than spreads them out 
among many partners.
Complementary client service  
capabilities
Our argument is premised on the logic of comple-
mentary capabilities. We argued that relational 
exclusivity unlocks the potential of partnering orga-
nizations to benefit clients because it improves 
their knowledge and use of network partners’ 
complementary client service capabilities. This logic 
implies that the hypothesized effect of relational 
exclusivity varies with the extent to which the focal 
providers’ and its partners’ capabilities can be 
combined to benefit clients. If providers have few 
complementary capabilities, their networks can 
produce little benefit to their clients, no matter how 
they might be structured. Conversely, if the partners’ 
complementarity is high, beneficially structured 
networks will help them direct their clients toward 
partners’ capabilities that they lack.
To probe the supporting logic of our first 
hypothesis, we examined the following additional 
hypothesis:
H2. The positive effect of relational exclusivity on 
client benefit is stronger to the extent that 
the providers’ and its partners’ client service 
capabilities are complementary.
The empirical setting
We test our hypotheses using data that we collected 
on patient referral relations in a network of hospital 
Figure 1: High and low relational exclusivity. Note: Relational exclusivity is an attribute of the 
black node. Line thickness is proportional to relation intensity.
High Relational Exclusivity Low Relational Exclusivity
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organizations. Our choice of health care as the 
empirical setting is consistent with our focus on 
capability-related causal mechanisms. Because of 
the ethical and legal norms that mandate concern 
for patient well-being, motivational determinants of 
the quality of client service in health care may vary 
little and be poorly generalizable to other contexts. 
In contrast, health care providers’ use of partners’ 
complementary capabilities to benefit a patient is not 
mandated; it is subject to the effects of providers’ 
network features, as it is in other types of services.
The health care system in Lazio
Lazio is the large Italian region with the center in Rome 
and a population of almost 5.9 million. The health 
care system in Lazio is part of Italy’s National Health 
Service (INHS), a publicly funded health care system 
providing universal insurance coverage to all citizens 
and legal residents. During the four-year period 
covered by our data, the system had 110 facilities in 
Lazio, 59 of which were publicly owned hospitals. The 
remaining 51 were accredited private hospitals and 
contracting ambulatory care organizations. All 110 
facilities, regardless of the ownership form, accepted 
universal health insurance.
The system underwent reforms in the 1990s, 
aimed at improving overall performance. Among 
other changes, the reforms introduced a diagnosis-
based system of reimbursement of hospital services, 
established financial performance criteria and 
made hospital CEOs responsible for meeting them, 
gave patients more freedom to choose health care 
providers, and made funding more directly dependent 
on the amount and quality of provided services. The 
reforms created a quasi-market designed to sustain 
the equity benefits of traditional public healthcare 
systems while also reaping the potential efficiency 
gains from competition (Barretta, 2008). In this hybrid 
arrangement, accredited hospitals compete for patients 
and INHS budget allocations but may also cooperate in 
the interest of public health (Lomi and Pallotti, 2012).
Inter-hospital patient referral
Inter-hospital referral of patients is a common 
collaborative activity for health care institutions 
(Iwashyna and Courey, 2011; Lomi and Pallotti, 
2012). We focus on the referral of inpatients under 
nonemergency conditions. Engaging in such referral 
is voluntary for hospitals − they have the discretion to 
make, accept and refuse referral requests. There are 
no regulations prescribing the choice of collaboration 
partners or requiring that hospitals give reasons for 
acceptance or refusal. Nor may a hospital be forced 
to refer a patient simply because it lacks beds or 
admits no patients with particular symptoms or 
condition − by definition, inpatient referral may only 
happen if the patient was previously admitted to 
the sending hospital. As hospitals face few external 
pressures in nonemergency referral decisions, the 
referral destinations are determined, alongside care 
quality, by informal, hospital-specific norms and 
routines (Bosk et al., 2011; Veinot et al., 2012).
Patient referral networks are uniquely suited to 
our empirical purposes for at least four reasons. 
First and foremost, patient referral data can detect 
the particular benefits that accrue to care recipients 
from relations between providers, rather than risk 
confounding these benefits with those that come 
from other sources. When a patient is referred to 
a hospital delivering services of higher quality, we 
know that the improvement in service quality that 
she experiences is due to a particular instance of 
interorganizational collaboration. In contrast, in most 
other instances where clients may benefit or suffer 
from interorganizational relations, no quantitative 
method can reliably link a client’s outcome to any 
particular relation. This link can only be established 
in in-depth case study (Provan and Milward, 1995) or 
indirectly inferred from correlation between network 
variables and client outcomes (Hochberg et al., 2007).
Second, our statistical inference is immune to 
selection biases resulting from service recipients’ 
actions because patients surrender control at 
admission over interhospital referrals. Patients cannot 
choose where they will be referred; like any other 
treatment decision, referral remains a prerogative of 
the hospital in charge of the patient.
Third, the exclusivity of patient referral relations 
exhibits wide and meaningful variation, necessary for 
the test of H1. Some hospitals’ patient referrals are 
episodic acts, negotiated and coordinated ad hoc 
for each specific instance. In other cases, patient 
referral is a manifestation of an underlying rich and 
lasting, exclusive interorganizational partnership. 
Such partnerships involve well-developed knowledge 
exchange routines, trust and joint decision making 
(Bosk et al., 2011; Gittell and Weiss, 2004). They 
predate and transcend specific instances of referral.
Finally, the particular methodological advantage 
of the inpatient referral network in Lazio is that it is 
largely contained within the region. In the period that 
we studied, only between 6 and 8 percent of Lazio’s 
inpatient referrals crossed the region’s boundary 
(Marrocu et al., 2016, p. 24). Network boundary 
specification, an endemic problem in network studies, 
is thus not a major concern in our data.
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Data
Our quantitative data come from the Regional 
Hospital Information System database maintained 
by the Public Health Agency of Lazio. The database 
holds information on attributes of the 110 hospitals 
in the region accredited by the INHS and on referral 
patient flows between them, recorded annually 
from 2006 through 2009. We used data on all of 
these hospitals except two that referred no patients. 
The data set records a referral only if the receiving 
hospital admitted the referred patient. To improve our 
contextual understanding of patient referral in Lazio, 
we conducted 17 semi-structured interviews with 
region’s physicians and hospital administrators.
Measures
Data structure and model
Our data set has a four-wave panel structure: the 
variables are measured yearly at the level of the 
hospital. Standard errors may be biased when 
regression models are estimated with panel data sets 
because the residuals are subject to correlation across 
repeated observations within organizations and within 
periods. To preclude such bias, the standard errors 
in the linear regression models reported below were 
corrected for hospital-level and year-level clustering 
(Cameron et al., 2012; Thompson, 2011). The correction 
algorithm calculates standard errors in three cluster-
robust covariance matrices: one with clustering by 
the first variable (hospital), one with clustering by the 
second variable (year), and one with clustering by their 
intersection. The standard errors are then estimated with 
the matrix computed by summing the first two matrices 
and subtracting the third (Cameron et al., 2012). Unlike 
in fixed and random effects models, standard errors 
corrected for clustering by two variables are unbiased 
even when the effect of one clustering variable varies 
across levels of the other (Petersen, 2009)3.
Dependent variable: patient benefit
Patients benefit from interhospital referral networks 
to the extent that the receiving hospitals provide 
higher quality care than the sending hospitals (Bosk 
et al., 2011; Iwashyna et al., 2009; Lomi et al., 2014). 
The risk-standardized readmission rate (RSRR) is a 
common measure of the quality of hospital care (Axon 
and Williams, 2011; Horwitz et al., 2012; Landrum 
and Weinrich, 2006). When patients are frequently 
readmitted to a hospital, this attests that the hospital 
fails to cure the conditions that its patients need 
treatment for; conversely, if the readmission rate is low, 
the hospital routinely succeeds in curing its patients. 
The INHS officially defines hospital readmission as 
admission of the patient into the hospital from which 
that patient was discharged within previous 30 days 
for the same condition. To make this raw readmission 
rate comparable across hospitals, it is standardized 
by the types of medical procedures offered by the 
hospital and the complexity of cases treated. Cases 
of planned readmission (such as chemotherapy, HIV 
and kidney dialysis) are excluded from the calculation 
of the RSRR.
RSRR is routinely used by the INHS, Medicare, 
Medicaid and the Hospital Quality Alliance to measure 
patient outcomes in a way that is comparable across 
hospitals with different specialization profiles (Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2016). Unlike 
the mortality rate, the other common measure of care 
quality, RSRR is applicable to non-life-threatening 
conditions. RSRR has passed construct validity tests 
that compared it to hospital rankings and patient 
satisfaction (Boulding et al., 2011; Halfon et al., 2006; 
Horwitz et al., 2012). It also responds to interventions 
aiming to improve care quality (Coleman et al., 2006).
Despite its advantages and wide use, RSRR is not 
a perfect metric. It is a coarser measure of care quality 
than other possible readmission measures unavailable 
to us, such as department-level readmission rates. 
Also, the precise definition of unplanned readmission 
and the methods of cross-hospital standardization 
are a matter of debate in medical research (Axon and 
Williams, 2011). We embrace RSRR in awareness of 
these imperfections.
Following Lomi et al. (2014), we conceptualize 
patient benefit from a single instance of referral as the 
difference between the quality of care in the hospital 
that receives and in the hospital that sends the 
patient. Because lower readmission rates correspond 
to better quality, we subtract the RSRR in the 
sending hospital from that in the receiving hospital. 
Our dependent variable brings this patient benefit 
measure to the level of the hospital by summing 
these differences over all the hospital’s referrals made 
or received in the year. The higher the sum is, the 
greater is the total patient benefit from the hospital’s 
patient referral relations.
3This correction may be used with any pair of variables that 
make observations non-independent and with a variety of 
regression models. The stata code that implements correc-
tion for clustering on two variables in linear, probit, logit and 
tobit models is available at www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/
faculty/petersen/htm/papers/se/se_programming.htm.
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Because hospital and interhospital factors in 
a given year (rather than any prior year) are most 
relevant to the patient referral outcomes in that year, 
our dependent variable is not lagged.
Independent variables
Relational exclusivity
First-order network coupling captures the extent to 
which organizations concentrate their relations to few 
partners rather than spread them out among many 
potential partners (Uzzi, 1996). Researchers have 
used first-order network coupling in various contexts, 
adapting it to the type of network at hand (see e.g. 
Shipilov, 2005; Shipilov et al., 2011). In a network of 
patient referrals, the measure captures the extent to 
which hospitals concentrate their referrals to few of 
the many potential partner hospitals. It is computed 
as ∑Jj=1  P
2
ij , where Pij is the fraction of hospital i’s total 
patient referral flow accounted by referrals to or 
from partner hospital j, and J is the count of partner 
hospitals in i’s referral network. When the measure 
is close to 0, the hospital spreads out its patient 
referral relations among many partner hospitals, 
without clearly preferring some over others. When the 
measure is at its extreme value of 1, the focal hospital 
has an exclusive referral relation with one partner.
Complementarity of capabilities
One hospital may complement another’s patient care 
capabilities by having clinical expertise or equipment that 
the other lacks. For example, when a hospital lacking 
an oncology unit refers a patient with cancer symptoms 
to one that specializes in oncology, the hospitals are 
leveraging their complementarity for patient benefit. In our 
context, such complementarity is measurably reflected 
in hospitals’ clinical speci alty profiles. The profile of the 
focal hospital is complementary with its referral partners 
to the extent that its partners lack its clinical specialties 
and it lacks theirs. This type of complementarity is 
captured by the Jaccard distance (one minus the ratio of 
overlapping specialties to all unique specialties that either 
partner has) between a hospital and its partner. Thus, 
we compute the measure of clinical complementarity as 
the average Jaccard distance between the focal hospital 
and all its partners. There are 53 clinical specialties 
represented in the sample.
Control variables
We included a set of control variables to minimize the 
threat of omitted variable bias. To account for larger 
hospitals’ greater capacity to benefit patients, we 
included the hospital size, expressed as the number 
of beds. The average number of beds among the 
focal hospital’s referral partner hospitals captures the 
same capacity in the hospital’s partnership network. 
We controlled for the hospital’s occupancy rate, to 
account for the possibly higher propensity to refer 
patients when the hospital has a shortage of available 
beds. Because we expect geographic proximity to 
affect both the patient benefits and the networks that 
the hospitals create, we controlled for the average 
geographic distance between the focal hospital and 
its referral partners, weighted by the total yearly patient 
flow between them. Furthermore, we controlled for 
the ownership form, distinguishing private from public 
hospitals, to account for private organizations’ higher 
propensity to focus on economic performance at the 
expense of client benefit (Hansmann, 1980; Baum 
et al., 2000). The hospital attributes in our model that 
are potentially related to patient benefit from referrals 
include the total number of referral patients that the 
hospital sent and received in the given year, the case 
mix index (INHS’s standard measure of the complexity 
of the cases treated by the hospital), and the com-
parative performance index (CPI). The CPI is the 
annual hospital efficiency score, computed annually by 
the regional division of the INHS. The CPI captures the 
relative time that it takes the hospital to successfully 
treat cases of similar complexity. The index takes the 
value of 1 for hospitals whose performance is average 
compared with other hospitals in the region. It is 
below (above) 1 if the hospital performs above (below) 
the regional average. We also controlled for the RSRR 
in the focal hospital. This control is essential because 
hospitals with a higher readmission rate (i.e. those 
that provide less effective treatment) are by design 
more likely to benefit patients when they refer them 
to another hospital and less likely to do so when they 
receive referred patients.
Table 1 shows the measures’ descriptive statis-
tics and correlation matrix. All control variables 
except the number of referrals made and received are 
significantly correlated with the dependent variable 
and at least one main independent variable; exclusion 
of these variables would therefore subject the model 
to omitted variable bias.
Results
Are patients referred to hospitals  
providing better care?
Before examining the determinants of patient refe-
rral to hospitals providing better care, it is instructive 
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to see how commonly patients get routed toward 
higher- or lower-quality hospitals.
The numbers in Table 2 confirm that patient referral 
is not optimized to care quality in our setting, a pattern 
already noted in various patient referral networks (Bosk 
et al., 2011; Hains et al., 2011; Veinot et al., 2012). In 
every year within our observation period, a patient was 
slightly more likely to be referred to a hospital with a 
higher (worse) RSRR compared to the sending hospital 
than to a hospital with a lower readmission rate. The 
same tendency is evidenced by the negative mean of 
the patient benefit variable. Care quality improvement 
is thus clearly not a guaranteed outcome of patient 
referral in our setting, but rather a contingent feature 
dependent on partner hospitals involved.
The effect of relational exclusivity
Table 3 reports the results of the multivariate analysis 
of patient referral to hospitals with better care quality 
(lower readmission rate). Model 1 includes only the 
control variables. It has good predictive power, largely 
because the amount of benefit or harm a hospital (or 
any organization) can create is a function of its size, 
captured by the bed count and patient flow variables.
In Model 2, we add the measure of relational 
exclusivity. The model tests the notion that 
hospitals whose patient referral relations tend to be 
concentrated to few partners − rather than spread 
among many partners − create more benefit to their 
referral patients. The fit of the model significantly 
improved relative to Model 1, and R2 increased to 
0.54. The effect of the added variable is large and 
positive, supporting H1.
The effect of interaction of relational  
exclusivity and clinical complementarity
Model 3 includes the interaction term of clinical 
complementarity with relational exclusivity. The 
interaction effect is large, positive, and significant. 
Consistent with H2, this result shows that clinical 
complementarity amplifies the effect of relational 
exclusivity. Remarkably, it is only due to hospitals’ 
leveraging of clinical complementarity that this effect 
attains significance in Model 2. The non-significant 
main effect of relational exclusivity in Model 3 affirms 
that, at low levels of complementarity, the prediction 
of H1 does not hold. In other words, when partner 
hospitals have few complementary capabilities to 
be aware of and to act upon, relational exclusivity 
produces no significant patient benefit. On the other 
hand, the negative and significant main effect of 
clinical complementarity attests that, at low levels 
of relational exclusivity, hospitals that are highly 
complementary with their partners tend to refer 
patients into inferior care conditions. It is only at 
higher levels of relational exclusivity that clinical 
complementarity helps hospitals refer patients toward 
better care.
Figure 2 visualizes the moderating effect of clinical 
complementarity in Model 3. The vertical axis shows 
the effect of relational exclusivity on patient benefit 
at every level of clinical complementarity. The lowest 
value of this effect is 5.37, which corresponds to 
the main effect of relational exclusivity. The effect 
increases as clinical complementarity increases, 
reaching significance at p = 0.05 beyond the 10th 
percentile of clinical complementarity.
Table 2. The flow of referral patients by year and relative 
risk-standardized readmission rate.
Patients referred to hospitals where readmission rate is
Year
lower (better) than in 
sending hospital
higher (worse) than in 
sending hospital
same as in 
sending hospital
2006  8,524  9,454 153
2007  7,793  8,696   0
2008  7,670  7,869   0
2009  7,219  7,599 566
Total 31,206 33,618 719
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Table 3. Effect of relational exclusivity on patient referral to hospitals with better 
care quality.
Linear regression models with two-dimensional clustering of standard errors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Beds in focal hospital −0.02** (0.004) −0.02** (0.003) −0.01** (0.003)
Average beds in referral partner hospitals −0.004* (0.002) −0.003 (0.002) −0.004* (0.002)
Occupancy rate −5.42** (1.86) −3.82* (1.57) −4.11* (1.71)
Average weighted distance to partners (km) −0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02)
Private hospital 0.31 (0.90) 0.17 (0.85) −0.23 (0.83)
Case mix index −1.66** (0.58) −2.74** (0.72) −2.73** (0.70)
Comparative performance index 2.19 (1.61) 5.04** (1.91) 5.02* (2.00)
Referral patients sent in year <0.01 (<0.01) <0.01 (<0.01) <0.01 (<0.01)
Referral patients received in year 0.02** (<0.01) 0.02** (<0.01) 0.01** (<0.01)
Risk-standardized readmission rate −37.75** (13.93) −34.66* (16.45) −34.31* (16.08)
Clinical complementarity with partners ≤0.01 (2.73) −8.95** (3.33)
Relational exclusivity 15.18** (4.26) 5.37 (4.20)
Clinical complementarity with partners × 
Relational exclusivity
42.58** (14.05)
N 390 390 390
R2 0.50 0.54 0.58
LR χ2 (relative to previous model) − 36.70** 28.95**
Notes: Standard errors, clustered by hospital and year, are in parentheses. The unit of analysis is hospital-year. The 
intercept is omitted.*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
Supplementary analyses
We performed supplementary analyses to examine 
two types of potential threat to the validity of 
our results. First, we checked the robustness of 
our quantitative findings. Second, we examined 
the transcripts of our interviews with health care 
professionals to confirm that they understand the 
main concepts that we measured and consider them 
when making patient referral decisions.
Robustness checks
Because the positive effect of relational exclusivity on 
organizational outcomes has been shown to peak 
at an optimal level and then decline (Uzzi, 1996), we 
examined if our linear specification of this effect was 
warranted. We tried adding the quadratic term to 
Model 2. The quadratic term had no significant effect, 
and we omitted it. We also experimented with adding 
the quadratic term and its interaction term with clinical 
complementarity to Model 3. The added terms 
created multicollinearity and did not improve the fit of 
Model 3. The interaction of the quadratic term with 
clinical complementarity was not significant.
We also re-estimated Models 2 and 3 with 
the added variable measuring hospitals’ degree 
of specialization, a Herfindahl index summing the 
squared shares of beds allocated to each clinical 
specialty. Because more specialized hospitals tend 
to have more exclusive referral relations, models 
might have confounded the effects of specialization 
and exclusivity. With the Herfindahl index included 
in Models 2 and 3, both hypothesized effects 
retained their size and significance. The index had 
no significant effect, did not improve the model fit 
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and removed nine observations because of missing 
specialization data.
The results reported in Table 3 are remarkably 
robust to model specification. We reproduced both 
hypothesized effects in models with fixed hospital 
and year effects, with correction for clustering on one 
variable (year or hospital) only, with the Huber−White 
correction, and with uncorrected random effects. 
We also reproduced all effects when the sample 
was restricted to hospital partnerships where patient 
benefit values were positive. All results of robustness 
checks are available on request.
Relational exclusivity and complementary 
capabilities in health professionals’  
accounts
We used the transcripts of our interviews with health 
care professionals to verify that physicians and 
hospital administrators understand and use − at 
everyday, common-sense level − the concepts that 
we theorized and measured. Our 17 semi-structured 
interviews preceded the rest of our work on this study 
and were not intended to bear on its arguments. The 
objective of the interviews was to elicit first-hand 
accounts of why and how hospitals refer patients. 
Because we used a convenience sample, the data 
enable no robust causal inference. Nevertheless, the 
interview evidence added confidence that decision 
makers in hospitals understand relational exclusivity 
and complementary capabilities and consider them 
in making patient referrals.
Every respondent in our sample was asked “Why 
does your hospital refer patients to other hospitals?” 
Additional unscripted follow-up questions were 
asked to elicit extended answers to this question. 
Some follow-up questions were asked by email and 
answers were appended to the transcripts.
Our respondents, physicians and administrators 
alike, showed awareness of the role of relational 
exclusivity. In accordance with our hypotheses, 
they attested that exclusive relations help hospitals 
leverage knowledge of mutual complementary 
capabilities for patient benefit. A physician said:
There are a few hospitals that [together] send us […] 
60 to 70 percent of the [referral] patients [we receive]. 
[…] Apart from geography, [we prefer these hospitals 
because] they know what we can do for their patients. 
And, of course, we send our patients to these hospitals 
whenever needed4.
He proceeded to explain that exchange of patients 
with such frequent partner hospitals is easier because 
4All interview quotes are translated from Italian.
Figure 2: The marginal effect of relational exclusivity across the range of the clinical complementarity 
variable. Note: The 95% confidence interval shown in grey. The line is thicker where the marginal 
effect is different from zero at p < 0.05.
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information about what the partner can do for the 
patient can be more effectively communicated:
In some instances […[ a phone call of 20 minutes 
is enough [to finalize a patient referral]. […] [Such 
quick decision making] has to do with […] knowledge 
about resources […] and administrative procedures. 
Previous interaction helps us accumulate such precious 
knowledge.
The administrative director of a large children’s 
hospital similarly pointed out that procedural know-
ledge among frequent referral partners helps the 
efficiency of the referral:
Hospitals that send patients more regularly, or with 
which we have been in touch for a long time, are very 
good in sending us the right material that lets us fully 
understand [how we can help with] the clinical case. […] 
There are partners who know very well what we want 
to see in their referral requests. And this is not strictly 
related to the type of patient to be transferred, but rather 
it is about how they present their request and about the 
completeness of information.
A physician in a major teaching hospital suggested 
that exclusive relations may not only create aware-
ness of complementary care capabilities, but also 
the confidence that the partner will make these 
capabilities available when requested:
I remember a patient with lung cancer who […] 
developed an infection. We have no clinical ward for 
infection diseases at our hospital, so we decided 
to transfer the patient. […] We chose [hospital X] as 
partner because they have a good infectious disease 
department. […] I know they have the expertise and 
have never refused to receive a patient [from us].
Finally, we noted that awareness of complemen-
tary capabilities may motivate hospitals not only to 
send but also to receive referral patients. A physician 
reported that his hospital “primarily accepts patients 
coming from another hospital because we have 
better ability to treat their diseases.”
Discussion
Contributions and future directions
Under what conditions do clients benefit from 
providers’ partnership networks? Our answer builds 
on the idea that client benefits ensue from providers’ 
ego-network features that enable the use of mutually 
complementary capabilities to deliver higher-quality 
client service. We argued that relational exclusivity 
improves the providers’ knowledge and use of 
network partners’ complementary capabilities and 
thereby helps clients benefit from providers’ network 
relations. We hypothesized that organizations will be 
more likely to know their partners’ capabilities and put 
this knowledge to work for the benefit of the client to 
the extent that their relations are concentrated among 
few selected partners. The analysis supported this 
hypothesis. We also found that the hypothesized 
effect strengthens as the complementarity of 
providers’ client service capabilities increases, which 
supports the notion that relational exclusivity facilitates 
the use of such capabilities for client benefit.
Our argument and findings offer two contributions 
to organizational network theory. First, we offer early 
evidence that configurations of providers’ networks 
may not only benefit organizations, as previous 
network studies amply confirmed, but also deliver 
benefits to organizations’ clients. Second, our study 
transcends the notion that providers’ networks 
benefit clients when providers are motivated to serve 
client needs. We point out that motivation cannot fully 
account for clients’ benefits from providers’ networks 
and advocate a theoretical account that embraces 
the role of providers’ network features that unlock 
their client service capabilities. These contributions 
hold out a promise of a fruitful research program 
examining network features that make providers 
more or less capable of serving client needs. We start 
and encourage this research effort.
As the emerging literature on clients’ benefits from 
organizational networks matures, it may fruitfully mirror 
the earlier theoretical and empirical development 
of the literature on organizations’ benefits from 
networks. Two pathways in this development have 
been particularly rich in insight. First, research 
moved from examining the main effects of having 
ties (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994; Uzzi, 1996; Gulati, 
1998) toward contingent theories examining the 
benefits and drawbacks of networks depending on 
external environments and tasks at hand (Gulati and 
Higgins, 2003; Fleming et al., 2007). Second, studies 
progressed from focusing on the effects of network 
structures (Coleman et al., 1957; Granovetter, 1985) 
toward examining the content of network relations 
(e.g. Emirbayer and Goodwin, 1994). Both pathways 
remain largely untrodden in research on clients’ 
benefits. Future studies may examine how client 
benefits from networks are contingent on the intensity 
of competition among providers and on whether 
providers are for-profit or nonprofit. They may further 
consider how the structural effects are modified by 
cross-cultural variation in network relations’ content 
and by power inequalities between partners.
We see our methodological contribution in encou-
raging network research to capture the effects of 
43
CONNECTIONS
interorganizational relations directly, rather than infer 
such effects from relationships between network 
variables and outcome variables. Our method 
highlights the distinction between, on the one 
hand, capturing whether providers refer clients to 
network partners who offer better-quality service 
and, on the other hand, examining the correlation 
between a provider’s ego-network properties 
and its clients’ outcomes. In the former case, we 
can say with confidence that we are observing a 
relational effect: the client was served by a better-
quality provider because of the cooperation between 
specific providers in the network. In the latter case, 
we cannot rule out that the correlation exists due to 
unmeasured provider properties that simultaneously 
affect its networks and client outcomes, such as 
financial or other resources. Similar distinctions 
apply in all studies of relational outcomes, where only 
an unmistaken linkage between a relation and its 
outcomes can safeguard against spurious network 
effects.
Practical implications
Our argument suggests that service recipients’ 
outcomes may be improved by structuring providers’ 
network ties in ways that promote the coordinated 
use of providers’ service capabilities. This opens 
new ways of improving health care outcomes, 
particularly by countering the adverse effects of care 
fragmentation. Research has shown that patients 
are disadvantaged when patient care is spread 
across poorly coordinated providers and examined 
the merits of anti-fragmentation policies aimed at 
internalizing the care within formally organized groups 
of providers (Agha et al., 2017). Our study suggests 
that promotion of preferred provider-to-provider direct 
partnerships, rather than organized provider groups, 
may be a viable alternative anti-fragmentation policy.
Generalizability and limitations
We advocate caution in generalizing our argument 
or empirical results. This is not because there are 
evident reasons why relational exclusivity should fail 
to produce the hypothesized effects beyond health 
care, or beyond professional services, but because 
these reasons are largely unexplored. While a close 
examination of these reasons is beyond our scope, 
three conditions seem particularly likely to restrict the 
generalizability of our argument.
First, we expect relational exclusivity to generate 
client benefits only in settings where providers’ 
capabilities are differentiated. If providers have identical 
capabilities, their potential to improve products or 
services by partnering is limited. Indeed, as our 
analysis just showed, network mechanisms generate 
no patient benefits in hospitals whose network 
partners have similar service capabilities. Second, our 
argument depends on the presence of motivation to 
deliver good client service. Whichever client benefit 
potential provider networks may create, providers who 
lack all motivation to deliver good outcomes to clients 
− most typically in markets with limited competition − 
will not realize that potential. Third, the argument only 
applies when providers partner in matters of serving 
client needs. We do not theorize any client outcomes 
from partnerships established for other purposes, 
such as joint lobbying or acting against common 
competitors.
A variety of professional services meets the 
triple scope condition of differentiation, client 
service motivation, and partnering in matters of 
service. Beside health care, the three conditions 
are most reliably met in postsecondary education, 
accounting services, legal aid and venture capital − 
which all happen to be fields where, similar to health 
care, referrals of clients (or, in case of education, 
students) across organizations are common. In 
contrast, wholesaling commodity producers are not 
differentiated in capabilities relevant to end-consumer 
experience and thus fail to meet the first condition. 
Normally, however, we do not expect the presence 
or absence of any of the three conditions to be 
a binary contrast, but rather a matter of degree. In 
most contexts, a dedicated empirical investigation is 
required to determine whether the scope conditions 
are sufficiently met for our argument to apply.
Our study has a number of methodological 
limitations. First, our empirical scope is limited to 
a local health care system. While health care has 
obvious institutional idiosyncrasies, the problem of 
how collaboration among organizations may benefit 
their customers remains general. Our design would 
benefit from replication in different contexts, with 
measures of customer outcomes tailored to the 
context at hand. Second, our measures of care 
quality are coarser than we would have liked. With 
fine-grained, preferably patient-level health data, 
we would be able to go beyond hospital-centered 
measures such as RSRR and examine transaction-
level factors that affect patient outcomes. While 
access to patient-level information is difficult due to 
privacy concerns, such information may validate and 
improve the results of our study. Third, referrals are 
one of many types of interorganizational collaboration 
that may be potentially consequential for client 
benefit. We trust that future research will build on 
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our arguments and analysis and will examine the 
implications of other types of interorganizational 
collaboration for client benefit.
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